Abstract-Spectrum auctions allow a spectrum owner to allocate scarce spectrum resources quickly to the users that value them most. Previous solutions, while enabling reusability-driven and truthful spectrum allocation, are also expected to provide collusion-resistance, price fairness for homogeneous channels, online auction with unknown and dynamic spectrum supply, and bounded system performance. Existing works, however, lack most of these desirable properties due to the inherent technically challenging nature in the spectrum auction design. In this paper, we focus on the problem of allocating idle channels to spectrum users with homogeneous demands in a setting where available channels are arriving in a dynamic and random order. Taking spectrum reusability into consideration, we first propose THEMIS-I: a novel and efficient spectrum auction algorithm that achieves fair pricing for homogeneous channels, online spectrum auction under dynamic spectrum supply, and a log approximation to the optimal social welfare. To enhance the robustness of the system, we further propose THEMIS-II: a collusion-resistant design that can resist any number of coalition groups of small size while still possessing all the above desirable properties. We analytically show that THEMIS can achieve either truthfulness without collusion or t-truthfulness tolerating a collusion group of size t with high probability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful spectrum auctions enabling collusion-resistance and fair payments for homogenous channels simultaneously under dynamic spectrum supply. Experimental results show that THEMIS outperforms the existing benchmarks by providing perfect fairness of pricing for both the no-colluding case and the colluding case.
ITH the rapid growth of wireless technologies and applications, radio spectrum has increasingly become a critical yet scarce resource for wireless services [2] , [3] , [4] . It has been widely acknowledged that traditional centralized and static spectrum allocations led to an inefficient use of spectrum resources, which motivates the design of market-based approaches for redistributing the idle spectrum, providing spectrum opportunities for unexploited licensed bands and gaining efficient spectrum utilization.
Spectrum auctions, which allow a spectrum owner to sell licenses for signal transmission over specific bands, can allocate scarce spectrum resources quickly and efficiently to the users that value them most. Different from our familiar goods, spectrum or frequency band has a very unique characteristic called reusability. This is endowed by the inherent nature of interference in radio transmissions. That is, users whose radio transmissions do not interfere with each other in different geographic locations are able to use the same frequency simultaneously. Obviously, spectrum/frequency reusability enables the communication system to increase both coverage and capacity. However, it also poses new challenges for the spectrum auction design, e.g., the reusability makes it challenging to achieve truthful spectrum auction designs.
To accommodate reusability-driven frequency allocation, spectrum auctions have received great research attention in recent years [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . The main idea is to divide spectrum bidders into multiple non-overlapping segments based on the interference constraints using graph coloring algorithms [12] . The design goals are to achieve spectrum auctions with either truthfulness [5] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , or revenue maximization [10] , or collusion-resistance [9] , or privacy-preservation [8] , or satisfaction of spectrum users with heterogeneous demands [11] . While theoretically sound, most of them focus on the offline or say static auction model, where the set of spectrum users and the set of channels to be auctioned are fixed or pre-determined before the start of auction periods.
To achieve real-time spectrum auctions, online spectrum auction models have aroused much interest recently [13] , [14] , [15] . Deek et al. [13] investigated the online multi-good selling scenario. Under the same online auction model, Xu et al. [14] proposed an online semi-truthful spectrum auction scheme with channel preemption and extended the results to multichannel wireless networks in [15] . Without exception the above online designs consider the dynamic behaviors of spectrum users, while assuming spectrum resources are fixed and spectrum users are arriving dynamically. In a dynamic environment, however, previously-occupied channels may be continually released and made available for unsatisfied spectrum users in previous auction periods. That is, the availability of spectrum resources is changing dynamically. As far as we know, previous spectrum auction schemes do not apply to this online auction model (with dynamicallyarriving and unknown spectrum supplies), which has received limited research attention so far. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, prior works mainly aim at achieving truthful mechanism designs while assuming that bidders do not collude with each other [5] . In practice, there may exist small groups of users that have incentives to collude by adopting a non-truthtelling strategy to maximize their total utility. Last but not least, while almost all spectrum auction models consider the allocation of homogeneous channels with uniform characteristics, the resulting payments of different users for one channel vary greatly. More precisely, in existing studies [5] , [7] , a spectrum user's final payment for using a channel is determined by the intrinsic characteristics of the auction design such as the grouping methods [7] and the resulting allocation order based on other users' bids [5] . However, from the perspective of users, it is unfair for them to make payments that differ considerably for the same goods, i.e., homogeneous channels for radio transmissions.
To address the above concerns, in this paper we focus on the design of novel and efficient spectrum auction schemes under dynamic spectrum supply. In particular, we first present THEMIS-I: a truthful, fair pricing and online spectrum auction algorithm without bidder collusion, by introducing a two-level randomization into the selection of winning candidates and seamlessly integrating the channel allocation with carefully-designed pricing methods. On top of the that, we then propose THEMIS-II: a collusion-resistant online spectrum auction algorithm by introducing random rounding in the auction process. To still obtain fair pricing for homogenous channels, we adopt a randomized posted price strategy that offers bidders a "take it or leave it" price independent of bids of other bidders. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful online spectrum auctions enabling fair pricing and/or collusion resistance with dynamic spectrum supply. More specifically, we summarize our contributions as follows.
We formulate and investigate the problem of allocating channels to spectrum users in a setting where idle channels are arriving dynamically and the total channel supply is unknown, with the goal of maximizing the social welfare. We propose a new and novel online spectrum auction algorithm and show that it achieves all desirable properties, including truthfulness, price fairness, bounded efficiency, and online auction support with dynamic and unknown supply of idle channels. We extend our algorithm to defend against collusion attacks while still guaranteeing price fairness. We analytically show that truth-telling is an optimal strategy with high probability when the size of a collusion group is less than or equal to a threshold. We analytically show that the proposed schemes can achieve a log approximation to the optimal social welfare. Experimental results show that our schemes outperform the existing benchmarks by providing perfect price fairness for both non-colluding and colluding cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the preliminaries and definitions in Section 2. Then we examine the deficiencies and challenges from the perspective of a practical spectrum auction design in Section 3. We develop our spectrum auction mechanism and analyze its properties for the non-colluding case and the colluding case in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we conduct experiments to evaluate and compare the performance of our spectrum auction mechanisms with the existing benchmarks. We discuss the related work in Section 7 and finally conclude our work in Section 8.
PROBLEM FORMULATION, DEFINITIONS, AND PRELIMINARIES
Due to the scarcity of spectrum resource, we consider an online spectrum auction system, where an auctioneer (i.e., spectrum authority) sells licenses for signal transmission on available channels to n bidders (i.e., spectrum users) located in a geographic region. We assume channels over the spectrum to be auctioned have uniform characteristics and values (i.e., homogeneous channels), and each bidder i desires one channel. The exploration of spectrum users with heterogeneous demands will be left for our future work. In practice, channels are auctioned for use by winning bidders over a period of time, and they will be dynamically occupied and vacated later. Due to the dynamic nature of channel occupancy and release, the total channel supply is uncertain. A key characteristic of wireless communications is the ability to re-use frequencies to increase system capacity, and hence different bidders sufficiently far apart can operate on the same frequency. To model this, we represent the interference conditions among bidders by an interference graph: two bidders either interfere with each other or can use the same channel simultaneously. For the noncolluding case, we assume bidders do not collude with each other and make their bids independently. For the colluding case, we assume coalition groups of small size may cooperate with each other to manipulate their bids. When idle channels are arriving dynamically, the auctioneer should make the allocation and payment decisions in an online manner, with the goal of achieving price fairness, truthfulness and bounded performance.
Per-Channel Bid (b i )-It represents the per-channel bid submitted by bidder i. Let B ¼ fb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b n g denote the set of bids submitted by all the bidders.
Per-Channel Valuation (v i )-It represents the true value bidder i is willing to pay for one channel. We assume that the per-channel valuation is a private value and is known only to the bidder itself.
Per-Channel Payment (p i )-It represents the bidder i's payment for one channel.
Bidder Utility (u i )-The utility of bidder i is defined by
, where x i is a binary value: x i ¼ 1 denotes bidder i gets allocated after the spectrum auction; x i ¼ 0 otherwise.
Definition 1.
A truthful spectrum auction is the one that for any spectrum user i, regardless of the declarations of the others, u i achieves the maximum when user i bids for each channel at its valuation, i.e., b i ¼ v i .
One of our design goals is to maximize the social welfare, which is the sum of the valuations of winning bidders. In our model, due to spectrum reusability, a channel simultaneously used by two interfere-free users can be considered as two distinct selling items, which causes the number of selling items to be different from the number of vacant channels. For ease of understanding and explanation, we will first analyze properties of our mechanism by using the number of selling items, and finally associate the number of selling items with the number of vacant channels. In the following, we first give the definition of the sum of highest bids.
Definition 2. The sum of the first L bids (i.e., highest L bids) for the single-unit demand case is denoted by H-BID L ¼ P L i¼1 v i where v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v n are sorted in non-increasing order.
For ease of understanding, we provide a summary of notations used in this paper in Table 1 .
IDENTIFYING THE CHALLENGES OF SPECTRUM AUCTION DESIGN
We show that the existing truthful spectrum auction designs are insufficient to meet some practical and desirable properties when applied to our model. At first, we give the definition for the fair pricing scheme.
Definition 3.
A fair pricing scheme is the one that each winning spectrum user pays the same price for identical/homogeneous channels.
The Insufficiency of Price Fairness Under Dynamic Spectrum Supply. Consider the classical k-item Vickrey auction [16] where k winners pay at the ðk þ 1Þth bidder's bid, it achieves price fairness according to Definition 3. We show that when it is applied to a dynamic supply setting, the pricing outcomes become unfair. Assume there are three bidders, each of which requests one channel and interferes with each other. In a dynamic supply setting, there are two idle channels arriving sequentially. Without loss of generality, we assume B ¼ fb 1 ¼ 7; b 2 ¼ 6; b 3 ¼ 1g. Because idle channels should be instantly allocated in an online manner, the first idle channel will be allocated to bidder one with the pricing value equivalent to bidder two's bid, i.e., p 1 ¼ b 2 ¼ 6. After a short time period, the second channel is available and will be allocated to bidder two, and the payment equals to bidder three' bid, i.e., p 2 ¼ b 3 ¼ 1. During one auction period, the pricing is obviously unfair since bidder one values the channel most (i.e., declares the highest bid) but pays much more than bidder two for an idle channel. Thus, the natural extension of Vickrey auction to the online case with a spectrum dynamic supply makes the pricing unfair.
We next consider another truthful and efficient auction mechanism named VERITAS, which is particularly designed for spectrum auctions with channel reusability [5] .
Allocation:
1) Sort the bids in non-increasing order.
2) Extract the first bidder (e.g., bidder i) in the sorted list and check whether there exists a channel to satisfy bidder i, i.e., jDistinctðNðiÞÞj þ 1 k, where jDistinctðNðiÞÞj denotes the number of channels allocated to the interfering bidders of bidder i, and k is the number of independent channels. If the checking equation holds, allocate bidder i a channel with the lowest available index not in DistinctðNðiÞÞ. 3) Repeat step 2 until all the bidders are examined. Pricing: 1) Find the critical neighbor for each winner. The critical neighbor of bidder i is defined as follows: bidder i can get allocated if and only if it bids higher than its critical neighbor. 2) Charge each winner i with the bid of its critical neighbor multiplied by the number of channels allocated to winner i. In Figs. 1 and 2 , we show that VERITAS cannot achieve price fairness using two counter examples. Assume there are five bidders ðA; B; C; D; EÞ with bids fb A ¼ 7;
, each requesting at most one channel. Figs. 1 and 2 show the conflict graphs of five bidders competing for two channels CH 1 and CH 2 . In Fig. 1 , two channels arrive at the same time point. After the greedy allocation and the critical value based pricing, bidders A; B; C and E get allocated. However, for homogenous channels the payments of the winners are quite different: bidders A and B pay more than twice as the payment of bidder C, and more seriously bidder E pays nothing for free use. In Fig. 2 , two channels arrive sequentially at different times. Compared to the case in Fig. 1 , while the winners are still A; B; C and E, bidder A pays even more and is charged at 5. Obviously, for both scenarios VERITAS [5] contradicts our definition of price fairness.
To achieve truthfulness, many spectrum auction designs determine each winner's payment based on other users' bids. As a consequence, the same channel is most probably priced at different values for different winning users. From the perspective of users, there exists price discrimination for identical goods (i.e., homogeneous channels) such that a winner charged at a higher price may prefer another winner's allocated channels and the payment to his own.
We use the definition of fair pricing scheme (i.e., Definition 3) to characterize the fairness of payment of each winning user for each homogeneous channel.
Truthfulness Under Channel Reusability and/or Spectrum User Collusion. When directly applied to spectrum auctions, conventional truthful auction designs, such as secondary pricing spectrum auction and VCG-style spectrum auction, become untruthful due to channel reusability [5] . Unlike conventional auction models, spectrum bidders have interference constraints with each other such that the number of available channels is different for different bidders. Therefore, a bidder could manipulate its bid to disrupt the resource allocation and pricing and thus inherently violates the truthfulness of auction designs. Besides, in many case studies of auctions run in practice, collusion is considered as a serious problem. The main reason why most of truthful auction mechanisms fail under collusion attack is that they are all deterministic. By leveraging this property, a group of colluding bidders may maximize their total group utility with a non-truth-telling strategy.
All of the above observations highly motivate us to design a new yet practical spectrum auction system that achieves all desirable properties.
TRUTHFUL SPECTRUM AUCTION UNDER DYNAMIC SPECTRUM SUPPLY: THE NON-COLLUDING CASE
In this section, we present THEMIS-I, a new spectrum auction scheme, achieving truthfulness, fairness with dynamic supply and efficiency. Different from previous spectrum auction schemes, our scheme will choose some bidders as eligible bidders that receive equal opportunity to get allocated. Intuitively, the larger value a spectrum user bids at, the higher chance it becomes an eligible bidder. However, an eligible bidder may lose a bid due to the introduction of randomization in the allocation process. Our spectrum auction scheme mainly includes three parts: an initialization process, a spectrum winner selection algorithm, and a pricing algorithm. Our spectrum auction design for the single-unit demand case is shown in Algorithm 1. We denote bidder i's bid by b i , which is the per-channel bid. Assume that the bid set B is sorted in non-increasing order of b i . Without loss of generality, let B ¼ fb 1 ; b 2 ; . . . ; b n g, where n denotes the total number of bidders. The initialization process mainly consists of two steps: 1) Eligible bidder selection. Select q from f2 1 ; 2 2 ; . . . ; 2 i ; . . . ; ng uniformly at random and let the q topranking bidders in B be eligible bidders.
2) Bidder grouping. Divide eligible bidders into multiple interference-free groups G ¼ fg 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g m g using graph coloring algorithm [17] . Intuitively, the random number q can be treated as a guessed number of the selling items (i.e, the channel item allocated to the winning bidders). As the information of the vacant channels is unknown, we need strategically guess it. Even though the guessed number might not be exactly equal to the number in the real case (e.g., the random number q is less or greater than the actual one), our mechanism's outcome in expectation will still achieve a provable bound compared to the optimum. By selecting the q topranking bidders in B as eligible bidders, a bidder cannot be eligible, when there exists an ineligible bidder with a higher biding value. This means that the larger the bid, the higher probability the bidder will be selected as an eligible bidder. In other words, the eligible bidder selection ensures that only those selected top-ranking bidders might be allocated a channel in our mechanism. Note that, if grouping first before eligible bidder selection, it will generally result in more bidder groups (the grouping approach is independent of bid values), ineligible bidders might interfere with eligible bidders and decrease the spectrum utilization as well as the social welfare. Hence, we select eligible bidders first before performing the bidder grouping.
Definition 4. An unassigned group is a group in which none of bidders has got allocated. An unassigned group becomes an assigned group once a bidder of the group gets allocated an idle channel, and accordingly the channel allocated to the bidder is assigned to this group.
In our spectrum auction model, idle channels are arriving in an unpredictable manner, the spectrum auctioneer should make online decisions for choosing winning bidders and allocating channels. In winner selection, the steps are as follows 1) Obtain a random permutation of
Extract the first available bidder in B 0 and check if the group, which it belongs is to, is unassigned or not. If the group is unassigned, directly allocate an idle channel to it and then mark it as assigned; otherwise activate the bidder and allocate the assigned channel of its group to it. After doing these operations, eliminate the satisfied bidder from B 0 . 3) Continue step 2 until all idle channels (which arrive online) are allocated, or all q eligible bidders are satisfied. Note that even if they are in an assigned group (see Definition 4), these eligible bidders will not get allocated until they are activated (Algorithm 1 line 25).
In Algorithm 1, the motivation of randomly rearranging per-channel bids of eligible bidders is that, eligible bidders may have the motivation to improve their own bids to obtain spectrum resource as early as possible due to the dynamical arrival of idle channels. Another key point in our design is that an eligible bidder will not get allocated until being activated. This is to ensure the channel allocation sequence strictly follows the permutation order of spectrum bidders.
We next consider the pricing algorithm. In online auctions under a dynamic spectrum supply, when bidder i gets allocated, it should be charged at the same time. The random number q obtained during eligible bidder selection determines not only the maximum number of winners but also the prices to be charged for all winners. So, no matter which group the bidder belongs to, each winning bidder is charged at b qþ1 , which is equivalent to the highest bid declined by the bidder (which is not allowed to use idle spectrum resources)
Bidders that do not get allocated pay zero.
Note that in Algorithm 1, if the vacant channels can satisfy all the q selling items and even more vacant channels are left, we will not allocate the remaining vacant channels to bidders; if the vacant channels cannot satisfy all q selling items, we only satisfy portion of eligible bidders following the random permutation. All the above designs are to ensure fair pricing and truthfulness simultaneously. In line 3 of Algorithm 1, the complexity of sorting bidders is Oðn log nÞ, where n denotes the number of bidders, and in line 5 of Algorithm 1, the time complexity of grouping algorithm is Oðn 2 Þ [17] . Furthermore, in the rest of the algorithm, each bidder is allocated at most once, and the number of operations in channel allocation for each bidder is a constant. Hence, the total time complexity of Algorithm 1 is Oðn 2 Þ. We next analyze the properties of the proposed spectrum auction scheme.
Analysis of Truthfulness. In the following, we prove the truthfulness by showing whether or not all eligible bidders can be satisfied, a bidder cannot gain any benefits by untruthful bidding.
Lemma 1. When all eligible bidders can be satisfied, any bidder cannot misreport the per-channel bid to increase its utility.
Proof. Assume there exist enough idle channels arriving dynamically such that all eligible bidders will be satisfied during one auction period. Among n bidders, however, only some of them will become eligible bidders. Let u In summary, if all eligible bidders can be satisfied by the incoming idle channels, we show that a bidder achieves maximum utility when bidding truthfully. This completes the proof. t u
We next consider the case where only some of the eligible bidders can be satisfied due to the limited number of idle channels during one auction time period. In winner selection and channel allocation phases, if a greedy allocation method (based on the per-channel bids) is adopted, an eligible bidder is highly motivated to improve its bid to obtain a higher rank so as to get allocated earlier in the eligible bidder set. Therefore, the order of allocation must be bid-independent.
Lemma 2. When not all eligible bidders can be satisfied, a bidder cannot misreport the per-channel bid to increase its utility.
Proof. Assume there does not exist a sufficient number of idle channels that can satisfy all eligible bidders during the online allocation. Thus, all eligible bidders have the motivation to get allocated earlier to prevent it encountering resource deficiency, which will lead to zero utility. In our algorithm, we randomly rearrange the sorted list of eligible bidders to disrupt the order of allocation among them such that the order of allocation is independent of the bid values of all eligible bidders. Hence, an eligible bidder cannot overbid to increase the probability of getting allocated earlier, i.e., overbidding will not help to increase its utility. On the other hand, by underbidding, an eligible bidder may lose the opportunity to get allocated and its utility will be zero.
As shown in Lemma 1, even if the channel supply is sufficient, an ineligible bidder cannot increase its utility by misreporting bid. Thus, we omit the discussions with respect to ineligible bidders here. t u Theorem 1. Under the dynamic channel supply, the proposed spectrum auction for the single-unit case is truthful.
Proof. By combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we can conclude that the proposed spectrum auction scheme for the single-unit case is truthful. t u
Analysis of Fairness. The following theorem shows the fairness of our spectrum auction scheme. Theorem 2. Under the dynamic channel supply, the proposed spectrum auction achieves price fairness.
Proof. In our algorithm, each winner will pay b qþ1 for one channel it gets, i.e., the per-channel payments are the same for all winners. According to Definition 3, our spectrum auction scheme for the single-unit case achieves fair pricing. t u
Analysis of Optimality. The following theorem characterizes the approximation ratio.
Lemma 3. When considering the spectrum reusability, if there is an allocation assigning R selling items over the unknown number of vacant channels, Algorithm 1 can allocate at least d R c e selling items under the same number of vacant channels. Here, c is the maximum size of interference-free groups.
Proof. The maximum size of interference-free groups represents the number of bidders one vacant channel can at most simultaneously satisfy. Therefore, in an allocation with R selling items, there are at least d R c e vacant channels providing the selling items. Considering the worst permutation allocating these vacant channels in Algorithm 1 (e.g., from the head of the permutation, each unsatisfied bidder interferes with all its precedents, before all of vacant channels used up in Algorithm 1), and thus each winning bidder needs to be assigned with one new vacant channel rather than reusing a channel with others (i.e., no spectrum reusability). In this worst case, as one vacant channel can provide one selling item at least, we conclude that Algorithm 1 can provide at least d Proof. H-BID R Ã is the sum of the first R Ã bids in the nonincreasing sequence v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v n . The social welfare of OPT is also a sum of R Ã bids. However, considering interference constraints, the outcome of OPT cannot be better than H-BID R Ã (i.e., the R Ã bids in OPT might not be the first R Ã bids in v 1 ; v 2 ; . . . ; v n ). Thus, the social welfare of OPT is less than or equal to H-BID R Ã . t u Theorem 3. Under dynamic channel supply, the proposed spectrum auction for the single-unit case can achieve a c log n approximation to the optimal social welfare. Here, c is the maximum size of interference-free groups.
Proof. Given the interference constraints among bidders, we first consider the optimal allocation OPT that achieves the maximum social welfare, and in optimal allocation, we let R Ã denote the number of selling items (i.e., the number of winning bidders in the single-unit case). Then, we consider the outcome of Algorithm 1. Recall that Algorithm 1 is a randomized algorithm based on a random permutation B 0 (Algorithm 1 line 6). According to lines 16 and 29 in Algorithm 1, our algorithm will stop when there is no vacant channel to be assigned with the head (i.e., the first) unsatisfied bidder in permutation B 0 , and let R 0 represent the number of selling items (i.e., the number of winning bidders) in permutation B 0 . Especially, executing Algorithm 1 over different permutations will have different outcomes where not only the social welfare but also the number of selling items (i.e., R 0 ) might be different. To analyze the performance of Algorithm 1 in all possible cases (including the worst case), we let R min denote the minimum of the number of selling items in outcomes of Algorithm 1 among all possible permutations. We then adopt R min in our analysis to evaluate the optimal solution as follows: (a) According to Lemma 3, we have R min ! d 
c e ! H-BID R Ã ! OPT and c Á H-BID R min ! OPT . In the following proof, we will analyze the performance under the worst case by R min to derive the approximation ratio to the optimum. In eligible bidder division, q is chosen randomly from f2 1 ; 2 2 ; . . . ; 2 i ; . . . ; ng to divide all bidders into eligible bidders and ineligible bidders. It is easy to see that the probability of choosing each possible values of q is 1=log n.
In the expectation calculation, we need to sum the products of probability and value for all possible cases respectively; however, in our analysis, we only need to analyze two specific cases to derive the approximation ratio. Recall that intuitively, R min is an achievable number of selling items in any allocation order (i.e., permutation) in Algorithm 1, including the worst case. Hence, interference constraints will not be considered again when analyzing the approximation by using R min .
Case 1: R min < q 2R min . In this case, at least half of the q bidders are selected as winners. Because R min winners are randomly chosen among eligible bidders (i.e., the members of fb 1 ; . . . ; b q g), that is, eligible bidders are satisfied following the order of random sequence B 0 , the expectation of the social welfare is R min q Á H-BID q . When R min < q 2R min , the social welfare is greater than or equal to 1 2 H-BID q . Case 2: 1 2 R min < q R min . In this case, there exists a surplus of selling items to be allocated to eligible bidders (i.e., R min ! q), and thus all eligible bidders will be satisfied. When 1 2 R min < q R min , the social welfare is H-BID q . We denote the social welfares of the case 1 and the case 2 by SW case 1 and SW case 2 , respectively. In case 1, because q > R min , we have SW case 1 ! H-BID R min . As we prove above, we bound OPT by c Á H-BID R min . Thus, the social welfare of the proposed spectrum auction scheme (i.e., Algorithm 1) in expectation is as follows:
t u
BREAKING USER COLLUSION FOR TRUTHFUL SPECTRUM AUCTION UNDER DYNAMIC SPECTRUM SUPPLY
In many case studies of auctions run in practice, collusion is considered as a serious problem. In this section, we present a collusion-resistant spectrum auction scheme under dynamic spectrum supply, i.e., the available selling items (idle channels that may serve multiple users simultaneously) are limited and arriving in an uncertain manner. In spectrum auction, collusion occurs when a group of bidders coordinate their bids to manipulate auction outcomes, gaining unfair utility improvement. More specifically, colluding bidders carefully rig their bids to improve their group utility, i.e., the sum of all bidders' utilities in the coalition group.
We first give an example to show that bidders can form coalitions and exchange side-payments to each other so as to increase the total utility of the bidders in the coalition group. Recall that in Algorithm 1 dealing with the non-colluding case, a random q is chosen for determining the number of eligible bidders, and winners pay at the q þ 1 ð Þth highest bidder's bid. In Fig. 3 , we assume there are three bidders whose channel usages are interfering with each other, and each of them demands only one channel.
Suppose that the set of per-channel valuations is
In one auction period, assume that two idle channels become available and are arriving simultaneously, and the random number q equals 2. When all users bid truthfully, i.e., B ¼ b A ¼ 7; b B ¼ 6; b C ¼ 5 f g , following Algorithm 1, bidder A and B are the winners, the per-channel price is 5, and the set of utilities is
Considering the case that A and B form a coalition group with the same random number q ¼ 2, bidder A still bids its true valuation at 7, but bidder B under-bids at 3 (i.e., the set of bids is then
According to Algorithm 1, bidders A and C are the winners, and the per-channel price 
decreases to 3. The resulting set of utilities is
In the new result, bidder B becomes an ineligible bidder due to its under-bidding; however, the total utility of the coalition group consisting of A and B increases from 2 þ 1 ¼ 3 to 4 þ 0 ¼ 4. Finally, A and B can exchange side-payments to each other to ensure both of them can gain benefits by colluding. This simple example clearly demonstrates that a group of bidders may have incentives to collude to increase their group utility and thus individual utilities.
Next we present our collusion-resistant spectrum auction scheme under dynamic spectrum supply while still guaranteeing fair pricing. Compared to Algorithm 1, the design of a collusion-resistant spectrum auction scheme requires to determine the eligible bidders and the price in a different way. As shown in Algorithm 2, our design mainly utilizes a sampling function and a consensus estimation function, which are critical to achieving collusion resistance. Before delving into the algorithm, we first introduce the key functionalities of the two functions. SampleðS; p r Þ represents the sampling function, which selects each member from a set S with probability p r . g c ðNðpÞÞ represents the consensus estimation function working on B [18] . In g c ðNðpÞÞ, p is a positive real number, NðpÞ denotes the number of bids greater than or equal to p, and c is a constant. Let y be a random variable uniformly chosen from ½0; 1, the output of g c ðNðpÞÞ is the smallest member in c jþy : j 2 Z f g which is at least NðpÞ, i.e., g c ðNðpÞÞ ! NðpÞ. In our scheme, we choose c to be 2. The rationale of choosing c ¼ 2 is that it ensures that the outcome of the estimation function (i.e., the estimated number) is no more than twice of dNðpÞe, which contributes to the derivation of the probabilities shown in Lemma 6. Now we describe our collusion-resistant spectrum auction scheme in detail. To achieve collusion resistance, we redesign the eligible bidder selection and the pricing algorithms as follows. 1 q Þ to select bidders for estimation. Let p represent the estimated qth highest bid value and B sample represent the set of selected bidders, respectively. The estimated value p is equal to the maximum of bids in B sample . In the next steps, the estimated value p is used for selecting eligible bidders and pricing.
Algorithm 2. Eligible Bidder Selection and Pricing
3) Estimate the number of bidders whose bids are above the estimated value. Use the estimation function g c ðNðpÞÞ to estimate the number of bidders that bid greater than or equal to p, which is denoted as n p . 4) Select eligible bidders from all bidders. After running steps 1À3, n p is computed. If n p q, let all of them be eligible bidders; Otherwise, we select eligible bidders from them with probability q=ð2n p Þ. Set the price to be p. However, if the size of the set consisting of final eligible bidders is greater than q, let the first q highest bidders be eligible bidders and set the price p to be the bid of the q þ 1 ð Þth highest bidder. We let B c denote the set of final eligible bidders.
Remark. In Algorithm 2, for ease of exposition we omit the steps of building assigned groups, unassigned groups and the interference-free bidder groups of eligible bidder set B c and the winner selection process, which are similar to Algorithm 1. Note that, the output of the estimation function g ð2Þ ðNðpÞÞ, i.e., n p , is insensitive to bid changes. That is, it ensures that with high probability, n p will not be influenced by the variations of no more than t bids. It is this property that guarantees Algorithm 2 can resist coalition groups of size smaller than or equal to t. Similar to the time complexity analysis of Algorithm 1, as the time complexity of (additional) sampling process for collusion resistant in Algorithm 2 is no more than Oðn 2 Þ, the total time complexity of Algorithm 2 is also Oðn
We next analyze the truthfulness of Algorithm 2 when coalitions of small groups exist.
Definition 5. An ðt; P Þ-truthful auction mechanism is the one that if no coalition of size t or fewer can increase their total utilities by misreporting the bids with probability P or higher.
The above definition holds even if multiple coalition groups, each of which is of size t or less, are present.
Lemma 6. Under the dynamic channel supply, Algorithm 2 is ðt; P Þ-truthful with P ¼ 1 À Qðt=qÞ, where t is the maximum size of a coalition group and the randomly-chosen q is specified.
Proof. In each auction period, the value of the randomlyselected q is equivalent to the maximum number of selling items. Given q, we analyze the following cases: i) Let c s denote the event that (at line 5 of Algorithm 2) the sampled bidder with the maximal bid p belongs to a coalition group; ii) Let c c be the event that, conditioned on p, n p is not a t-consensus [19] (which has the property that even if at most t bidders manipulate their bids, the n p remains the same.) and n p ! q. Based on the definition of n p , we have NðpÞ ! 1 2 n p ; iii) Let c o be the event that (at line 13 in Algorithm 2) the amount of sampled eligible bidders is greater than q. If none of the events c s , c c and c o occurs, any coalition group cannot improve its total utility by untruthfully bidding. That is, only in the three cases bidders have incentives to collude with each other. We next show why and how bidders collude in these cases.
In event c s (executing lines 8-10), we have n p q and the sampled bidder with the maximal bid p can directly manipulate the price. Thus, in the sample set at least one bidder belongs to the coalition group. In event c c , we have n p > q and n p is not a t-consensus, so a coalition group can manipulate its bids to influence n p . Thus, the coalition group has incentives to improve the total utility of the group by untruthful bidding. In event c o , the auction is a q-Vickrey auction, which is vulnerable to collusion attack. The bounds of all cases are analyzed as follows. [4] [5] , to directly manipulate the price, a coalition group requires that at least one member is in the sample set B sample . For a group of size t, as any of t members is sampled independently with probability 1=q, the probability of that one of its members is in B sample is t=q. Clearly, Pr½c s t=q. 2) In event c c , when n p > q, we have NðpÞ ! 1 2 n p and NðpÞ ! 1 2 q À t. The probability that the n p is not a t-consensus is Pr½c c log NðpÞ þ t NðpÞ À t log 1 þ 2t
1) In event c s (lines
3) In event c o , at line 12, the expected number of eligible bidders is NðpÞq= 2n p À Á . As NðpÞ n p , this expected value is at most q=2. By Chernoff Bound, the probability that the value in expectation (the expected number of eligible bidders) is exceeded by more than twice (e.g., the selling items are oversold) is at most e q 8 2 oð achieves a constant approximation to the sum of the highest bids given a specific q (i.e., H-BID q ) in expectation.
Proof. In our auction design, q is not only the number of eligible bidders but also the maximum number of selling items (even if the total number of selling items is larger than q, the algorithm only sells q items at most). In the single-unit case where each user demands one channel for use, the optimal solution can be derived from the q-Vickrey auction with q selling items. In Algorithm 2, the highest bidder in the sample set determines the p at line 5. We consider the probability that this bidder (i.e., the highest bidder in the sample set) is between the ðq=2Þth and the qth highest bidder (among all bidders) such that at least q=2 and at most q bidders bid higher than p. First, let x be the probability that none of the first q=2 highest bidders (each with probability 1=q) is in the sample set B sample . We have
Thus, we have
Next we consider the probability that in B sample , the highest bidder is from the ðq=2Þth to the qth highest bidders of B (at line 5). It implies two cases for bidders of B: 1) None of the first highest q=2 bidders is in B sample and 2) At least one of the bidders from the ðq=2Þth to the qth highest bidders is in B sample . Because the occurrences of two events are independent, the probability of both of them happens can be computed as
So, the probability that the highest bidder of B sample is from the ðq=2Þth to the qth highest bidders of B is at least ffiffi
e . In addition, when the highest bidder of B sample is from the ðq=2Þth to the qth highest bidders of B, it is easy to see that q=2 < NðpÞ < q. Then based on g c ðÁÞ we have n p < 2q, which is equal to
. It means that in B p , each is to be selected with more than probability 1=4 (at line 12).
So, the expected social welfare caused by the first q=2 highest bidders in permutation B (i.e., SW ½q=2 ) can be computed as
In the first line of the equation, intuitively
e is the lower-bounded probability that the highest q=2 bidders are in B p (line 6 in Algorithm 2) by Lemma 7; and q 2np is the probability that one bidder of B p is selected and log nÞ approximation to the optimal social welfare OPT. Here, c is the maximum size of interference-free groups.
Proof. We consider the optimal allocation OPT that achieves the maximum social welfare without collusion resistance, where we let R Ã be the number of selling items in OPT and n c denote the number of eligible bidders (i.e., the size of B c ) in Algorithm 2. Similar to Theorem 3, we let R min represent the minimum number of selling items in outcomes of Algorithm 1 among all possible permutations (allocations). Recall that Definition 2 for H-BID R min (i.e., the social welfare of the R min highest bidders in the non-increasing sequence). Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we also have c Á H-BID R min ! OPT . In our auction design, we randomly select q from 2 1 ; 2 2 ; . . . ; 2 i ; . . . ; n È É to limit the number of eligible bidders, and the probability of choosing one of the possible values for q is 1=log n. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we only analyze two specific cases to derive the approximation ratio to OPT. As the proof is the worst-case analysis, interference constraints have been considered while analyzing R min , we do not need to consider them additionally.
Case 1: R min < q 2R min . Recall that in the outputs of Algorithm 2, n c q. In this case, if n c R min , which guarantees that all eligible bidders (i.e., the members of B c ) will be satisfied, the social welfare is ð
8e H-BID q Þ based on the proof of Lemma 7; otherwise, if n c > R min , it means that only partial eligible bidders will be satisfied. Our scheme satisfies R min bidders from randomly-selected n c eligible bidders. Thus, the expectation of the social welfare is ð
8e H-BID q Þ. As we have q 2R min and n c q, the social welfare is equal to or greater than ð
8e H-BID q Þ. Case 2: 1 2 R min < q R min . As q R min and n c q, we have n c R min , which means that all eligible bidders in Algorithm 2 will be satisfied. Hence, the social welfare is
8e H-BID q . We denote the social welfares of cases 1 and 2 by SW case 1 and SW case 2 , respectively. In case 1, as q > R min ,
8e H-BID R min Þ. In case 2, as q > 
OPT:
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we perform extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of THEMIS-I (without collusion) and THEMIS-II (with collusion) under a dynamic supply of idle channels. We explore the unique properties of THEMIS-I/II by comparing them to two well-known spectrum auction mechanisms VERITAS [5] and SMALL [7] .
Methodology
In our experiments, the number of bidders varies from 50 to 400. Bidders are randomly distributed in the area of 2;000 Â 2;000 square meters and the conflict range for each bidder is 400 meters. As shown in previous analysis, the efficiency performance bound derived above does not rely on the distribution of the arrival of idle channels. Thus, the use of any distribution in our experiments will not affect the results. We assume each bidder requests one channel, and its perchannel bid is randomly distributed over ð0; 1 [5] , [7] . All experimental results are averaged over 200 rounds. For bidder grouping, we divide eligible bidders into interferencefree groups using the greedy grouping algorithm in [17] . The highlight of our spectrum auction designs are the realization of fair pricing, truthful bidding and/or collusion resistance in a practical setting where idle channels are supplied to spectrum users in a dynamic manner. The proposed solutions are randomized mechanisms. To carefully characterize these unique properties, we use the following three customized performance metrics.
Coefficient of Variation. Coefficient of variation is a statistical measure of the dispersion of data points in a data series around the mean, and it is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation s to the mean m, i.e., C v ¼ s m . We compute C v of per-channel payments of all winners to evaluate the fairness of pricing. Obviously, the lower C v the better fairness can be achieved, and it means that there exist less differences among the per-channel payments of all winners. Winning Bidder Ratio. Winning bidder ratio is used to evaluate if all the winners are the ones that have the highest per-channel bids among all bidders, and it is defined as the ratio of the number of winners with the highest bids (among all bidders) to the number of winners. In fact, this metric reflects the fairness of allocation, which means bidders with higher perchannel bids should be satisfied when idle channels are arriving dynamically. Eligible Bidder Satisfaction Ratio. Eligible bidder satisfaction ratio is used to evaluate if all eligible bidders can be satisfied given an unknown supply of idle channels, and it is defined as the percentage of winners or say satisfied bidders among all eligible bidders. Note that our schemes randomly choose the number of eligible bidders, and only an eligible bidder has the opportunity to get allocated. This characteristic is distinct from the existing spectrum auction schemes such that the eligible bidder satisfaction ratio does not apply to VERI-TAS [5] and SMALL [7] . So, we do not compare the eligible bidder satisfaction ratio of our solutions to the existing ones. In addition, VERITAS and SMALL are single-round offline spectrum auction designs, so we carefully make an extension of them to obtain a fair comparison. For VERITAS, we perform channel allocation once some idle channels arrive and then do the pricing for winners. The critical value is computed for the unsatisfied bidders in previous rounds while taking into account the inference constraints caused by previous winners. For SMALL, we randomly generate channel reserve price for each coming idle channel from ½0; 2Þ following the same assumption made in [7] . When idle channels arrive, we run SMALL for all unused channels and unallocated groups. Fig. 4 compares the coefficient of variations of winners' payments against the number of spectrum users under THE-MIS-I, THEMIS-II, VERITAS and SMALL. As can be seen, although the numbers of spectrum users increase, THEMIS-I/II all achieve a constant zero C v . This is because in our payment scheme each winning user pays at the same price while truthful bidding is still enforced. In comparison, VERITAS and SMALL inherently require different payments of each winning bidder to guaranteeing truthfulness. Thus, our spectrum auction designs indeed provide fair pricing for spectrum users bidding for homogeneous channels.
Coefficient of Variation

Winning Bidder Ratio
Fig. 5 provides a comparison of the winning bidder ratios of THEMIS-I, THEMIS-II, VERITAS and SMALL against the number of spectrum users. In general, the results show that the ratio will gradually decrease when the number of users increases. As can be seen, VERITAS and THEMIS-I have similar performance, ensuring that most of bidders with higher bids get satisfied and become winners. This is because VERITAS adopts a greedy allocation strategy and our schemes also choose q eligible bidders with the highest bids for future allocation. The small performance loss is due to the randomization of eligible bidders during the channel allocation process in our spectrum auction design. Not surprisingly, THEMIS-II achieves a lower ratio than THEMIS-I. The reason is that in the sampling process, THEMIS-II randomly selects eligible bidders from the first q highest bid bidders to defend against bidder collusions. Consequently, in certain cases some bidders with higher bids will not become eligible during the sampling process. Finally, SMALL achieves a relatively lower ratio since it allocates idle channels based on the group bids, which relates to the bidder with the lowest bid in the group. Thus, in some cases it is difficult for some bidders with higher bids to get allocated since the groups they belong to may have very low group bids.
Eligible Bidder Satisfaction Ratio
Different from most of previous spectrum auction schemes including VERITAS and SMALL, the winner selection and channel allocation of THEMIS-I and THEMIS-II are randomized to select so-called eligible bidders, which obtain the opportunities to get allocated. To obtain the percentage of winners or say satisfied bidders among all eligible bidders, we evaluate the eligible bidder satisfaction ratio under different idle channel supplies. Figs. 6 and 7 illustrate the eligible bidder satisfaction ratio of THEMIS-I and THEMIS-II, respectively. When the number of idle channels is increasing, correspondingly the ratio is approaching 1; on the other side, for the same number of idle channels, the more participants (e.g., bidders) the lower the ratio. In Fig. 8 , as expected, the larger the bidder set the larger number of idle channels is required to satisfy all eligible bidders. We can also observe that a small number of idle channels can satisfy a larger number of eligible bidders due to the property of spectrum reusability. In Fig. 9 , we evaluate the probability that a group can successfully improve its group utility by varying the group size from 2 to 5 under different q. Note that we first select the successful colluding groups that can improve their group utility when using our Algorithm 1 given a specific q. Then the probability of a successful collusion represents the possibility that a collusion group can still obtain extra utility gain in our collusion-resistant mechanism. Fig. 9 illustrates that the larger the coalition group size the higher the successful probability. This is because for a larger collusion group, its members have more possibility to adopt more strategies to make themselves to be allocated and obtain extra utility gain. As shown in the figure, our collusion-resistant mechanism can significantly reduce the incentives of bidders in these groups to collude with each other.
RELATED WORK
Spectrum auction, which allows an authority to sell licenses for signal transmission over specific bands, allocates scarce spectrum resources quickly and efficiently to the users that value them the most. In contrast to the auction of other digital goods, spectrum has a very unique characteristic called reusability due to the inherent nature of interference in radio transmissions. That is, users whose radio transmissions do not interfere each other in different geographic locations are able to share the same spectrum simultaneously. Obviously, spectrum/frequency reusability enables the communication system to increase both coverage and capacity. However, it also poses new challenges for the spectrum auction design, e.g., the reusability makes it hard to achieve a truthful design and to provide bounded performance in terms of social welfare/revenue. Recently, spectrum auctions have received extensive research efforts in the literature [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . In [5] , Zhou et al. utilized the greedy allocation together with the critical value based pricing in [20] to design a truthful and computationally efficient spectrum auction mechanism under the bidder interference constraints. In [9] , the same authors proposed Athena, a collusion-resistant spectrum auction mechanism using APM [19] . By first dividing bidders into multiple non-overlapping segments based on the interference constraints, the spectrum auction problem is transferred to a single-unit auction problem with an unlimited frequency/channel supply and the partition independence property of bids enables cheating-resistance. Different from [9] , our collusion-resistant design is dealing with the case that the number of idle channels in one auction period is unknown and they are arriving in a dynamic manner. Fig. 9 . The probability that a group can successfully improve its group utility versus the size of collusion groups.
Similar models of spectrum auction [7] , [8] , [11] were studied and the resulting auction schemes with different design goals have been proposed in recent years. Huang et al. [8] presented a truthful and privacy-preserving spectrum auction mechanism, called SPRING, which used two cryptographic tools order-preserving symmetric encryption (OPSE) [21] and oblivious transfer (OT) [22] to prevent attackers from learning private information of bidders. Wu et al. [7] proposed a mechanism, called SMALL, to adapt to bidders with multiple radios by dividing bidders into segments and setting a reserve price for channels such that bidders cannot benefit by manipulating their own bids. These models addressed the problem of spectrum reusability by using the graph coloring algorithm to divide bidders into different groups [12] , and the smallest bid is selected in each group as a group bid for resisting bidder misreport. In [11] , Chen et al. proposed TAMES, a truthful double auction for bidders with heterogeneous demands and showed that the auctioneer can choose different graph coloring algorithms for different goals. While theoretically sound, these spectrum auction mechanisms do not provide performance bounds to characterize the system performance in terms of social welfare or revenue. In addition, they only focus on the offline auction model, where the set of users (i.e., channel bidders) and the set of goods (i.e., channels) are pre-determined before the start of auction process.
Recently, researches on online spectrum auction models have aroused much interest [13] , [14] , [15] . In general, there are two types of online spectrum auction models: spectrum users arrive in an online manner and spectrum supplies arrive in an online manner. In [13] , Deek et al. made an extension of [5] and investigated the online multi-good selling scenario in [23] . Considering the online arrival of users, the authors proposed an efficient online spectrum auction mechanism with preemption, enabling the resistance of both bid-and time-based cheatings. However, it does not provide a performance bound on revenue with respect to the optimal solution in general. Under the same online auction model, Xu et al. [14] proposed TOFU, another online semitruthful spectrum auction scheme with channel preemption. To carefully characterize the auction model, the authors derived competitive ratios under different application scenarios. Different from the previous solutions, TOFU achieves only semi-truthfulness, where users are able to underbid to gain self-benefits. In practice, while the set of bidders is known to the auctioneer, the exact number of items for sale may be uncertain, e.g., the spectrum auctioneer allows users to bid for idle channels released dynamically by other spectrum users. Thus, another online model involves the online arriving spectrum supplies during auction. However, online spectrum allocation design on this model has received limited attention so far. Note that, previous online spectrum auction schemes considered the fixed spectrum supply. They (e.g., [14] , [15] ) cannot be directly applied to the dynamic supply case since they strictly require that the spectrum supply is fixed. In fact, if the spectrum supply is dynamic, their schemes cannot work at all due to the assumptions made in the auction theories that these schemes are based on. Similarly, if our model also let the demand or n change, the demand and supply matching problem will become very complex, which makes it hard to characterize the problem mathematically while satisfying the truthfulness property. In this work, we do not investigate this challenging open research problem and will leave it as our future work. Besides, the dynamic release of channels to users also arouses the question of designing a fair pricing scheme. Almost all existing spectrum auction models consider homogeneous channels, but the payment for a channel will be quite different. From the perspective of users, it is unfair for them to make different payments for the same goods especially when idle channels are arriving online. To solve this problem, a line of studies on envy-free auction design has been proposed [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] , where all users can obtain the same goods by the same payment. These studies focus on different goals, including maximizing the total profit [24] , proving the competitive ratio [25] , pricing optimally on single-minded combinatorial auctions [26] and considering distributional information in the auction design [27] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of allocating channels to spectrum users in a setting where the supply of idle channels is unknown, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We designed two truthful and efficient spectrum auction schemes, dealing with the non-colluding case and the colluding case and providing different users with fair pricing for homogenous channels and guarantee bounded performance with respect to the optimal social welfare. We analytically showed the truthfulness and approximation ratio of our spectrum auction designs. Our experimental results validated our analysis and demonstrated the practical and desirable properties of our spectrum auction designs.
To our best knowledge, our current work represents the first effort to formulate and investigate the truthful frequency allocation problem with a dynamic spectrum supply. As our future work, a challenging open problem remains to be solved is how to achieve truthful auction design and maximize the social welfare under dynamic spectrum supply, when there exist spectrum users with heterogeneous demands (i.e., users with single-unit demand and multi-unit demand are both in the system). We still aim to achieve both efficiency, pricing fairness and truthfulness for the proposed mechanisms. " For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
